

FILED
Court of Appeals
Division I
State of Washington
4/1/2020 3:49 PM

FILED
SUPREME COURT
STATE OF WASHINGTON
4/2/2020
BY SUSAN L. CARLSON
CLERK

Supreme Court No. 98360-7

Court of Appeals No. 79008-1-I

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

v.

JOEL ISAAC MECHAM,

Petitioner.

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE
OF WASHINGTON FOR SNOHOMISH COUNTY

PETITION FOR REVIEW

Kate Benward
Attorney for Petitioner

WASHINGTON APPELLATE PROJECT
1511 Third Avenue, Suite 610
Seattle, Washington 98101
(206) 587-2711

TABLE OF CONTENTS

A. IDENTITY OF PETITIONER..... 1

B. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1

C. STATEMENT OF THE CASE..... 2

D. ARGUMENT WHY REVIEW SHOULD BE GRANTED 3

 1. This Court should grant review and reverse a community custody condition that violates Article I, section 11 and the First Amendment by restricting an individual’s religious practice based on a crime that incidentally occurred in a church. RAP 13.4(b)(3). 3

 2. The community custody condition ordering Mr. Mecham to stay out of “restaurants marketed to and designed to cater to children” deprives him of fair warning, contrary to this Court’s requirements that community custody conditions must give an ordinary person notice and may not invite arbitrary enforcement. This Court should grant review. RAP 13.4(b)(1) and (3). 6

 3. This Court should grant review and reverse a community custody condition that restricts family relationships absent evidence this restriction is crime related, and which violates the right to intimate association. RAP 13.4(b)(2) and (3). 8

E. CONCLUSION..... 11

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Washington State Supreme Court Decisions

<i>City of Bremerton v. Widell</i> , 146 Wn.2d 561, 51 P.3d 733 (2002) 8, 9	
<i>First Covenant Church v. Seattle</i> , 120 Wn.2d 203, 840 P.2d 174 (1992).....	4
<i>Munns v. Martin</i> , 131 Wn.2d 192, 930 P.2d 318 (1997)	4
<i>State v. Padilla</i> , 190 Wn.2d 672, 677, 416 P.3d 712 (2018)	8
<i>State v. Riley</i> , 121 Wn.2d 22, 846 P.2d 1365 (1993)	10
<i>State v. Wallmuller</i> , 194 Wn.2d 234, 449 P.3d 619 (2019).....	8

Rules

RAP 13.3	1
RAP 13.4(b)	1, 8, 11

Constitutional Provisions

Const. art. I, §11	1, 3
U.S. Const. amend. I.....	1, 3
U.S. Const. amend. IV.....	<i>passim</i>

Washington Court of Appeals Decisions

<i>State v. Balzer</i> , 91 Wn. App. 44, 954 P.2d 931 (1998)	4, 5
<i>State v. Johnson</i> , 4 Wn. App. 2d. 352, 421 P.3d 969 (2018)	9
<i>State v. Kinzle</i> , 181 Wn. App. 774, 326 P.3d 870 (2014)	10

United States Supreme Court Decisions

<i>Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale</i> , 530 U.S. 640, 120 S. Ct. 2446, 147 L. Ed. 2d 554 (2000).....	8
--	---

A. IDENTITY OF PETITIONER

Joel Mecham, petitioner here and appellant below, asks this Court to accept review of the Court of Appeals decision 79008-1-I, issued on March 2, 2020, pursuant to RAP 13.3 and RAP 13.4(b)(1), (2) and (3). The opinion is attached.

B. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. When sentencing Mr. Mecham for the offense of second degree child molestation for conduct that incidentally took place in a church, the court imposed a community custody condition prohibiting Mr. Mecham from attending church services unless accompanied and supervised by an adult aware of his crime. Does this restriction on his religious practice violate Article I, section 11 and the First Amendment? RAP 13.4(b)(3).

2. Does the community custody condition requiring Mr. Mecham to stay out of “restaurants marketed to and designed to cater to children” deprive him of fair warning because it is vague and overbroad? RAP 13.4(b)(1) and (3).

3. Where Mr. Mecham did not gain access to children through adult relationships, does the community custody condition restricting him from forming relationships with

families fail because it is not crime related and impermissibly infringes on his right to intimate association? RAP 13.4(b)(2) and (3).

C. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Joel Mecham entered a negotiated guilty plea to the offense of second degree child molestation and fourth degree assault with a sexual motivation. CP 38, 46. These offenses involved illegal touching of minors. CP 38, 46. He admitted to sexually touching minors (1) in a church, and (2) in a park and ride. CP 65; 69. Mr. Mecham did not appear to have a personal relationship with either of the minors. CP 65-69.

Over Mr. Mecham's objection, the trial court imposed various conditions of community custody in violation of his constitutional rights, including that he:

- "Stay out of...church services," but "may attend church services and restaurants if accompanied and supervised by an adult aware of the offense and approved by the CCO."
- "Stay out of restaurants...marketed to and designed to cater to children."

- “Do not form relationships with families who have minor children except as approved by Sex Dev. Provider.”

CP 32-33.

The Court of Appeals affirmed these conditions,¹ finding no violation of his free of exercise of religion or due process rights. Slip op. at 7-12, 15-16.

D. ARGUMENT WHY REVIEW SHOULD BE GRANTED

1. **This Court should grant review and reverse a community custody condition that violates Article I, section 11 and the First Amendment by restricting an individual’s religious practice based on a crime that incidentally occurred in a church. RAP 13.4(b)(3).**

The trial court’s requirement that Mr. Mecham only attend church services if supervised by another adult aware of his offenses is not narrowly tailored, in violation of his right to the free exercise of religion.

The constitutionally protected freedom of religion includes the free exercise of religion. Const. art. I, §11; U.S. Const.

¹ The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded to strike the condition requiring Mr. Mecham to “disclose sex offender status prior to any sexual contact,” finding it was an unconstitutional compulsion of speech and was not crime related. Slip op. at 13. The trial court also reversed and remanded to strike the condition restricting his “sexual contact in a relationship” because it was not crime related. Slip op. at 15.

amend. I. The State Constitution provides greater protection of the freedom to exercise religion than does its federal counterpart. *State v. Balzer*, 91 Wn. App. 44, 53, 954 P.2d 931 (1998) (citing *First Covenant Church v. Seattle*, 120 Wn.2d 203, 226, 840 P.2d 174 (1992)). Because this is a fundamental right of “of vital importance,” any burden upon religious free exercise must withstand strict scrutiny. *Id.*

Under the test for strict scrutiny, the complaining party must first prove the government action has a coercive effect on the practice of religion. *Balzer*, 191 Wn. App. at 53. Once a coercive effect is established, the burden of proof shifts to the government to show the restrictions serve a compelling state interest and are the least restrictive means for achieving the government objective. If no compelling state interest exists, the restrictions are unconstitutional. *Id.* at 53-54 (citing *Munns v. Martin*, 131 Wn.2d 192, 199, 930 P.2d 318 (1997)).

Here, one of the allegations against Mr. Mecham involved a church, with which he and his family are very involved. 9/10/18 RP 13. The court imposed the community custody condition that requires another adult aware of his conviction to

accompany Mr. Mecham when attending church services. CP 33 (Condition 16). Because this places a burden on Mr. Mecham's ability to freely exercise his religion, the State must be able to establish a compelling state interest is achieved through the least restrictive means. *Balzer*, 91 Wn. App. at 53.

The Court of Appeals erroneously found Mr. Mecham is not unduly burdened by this restriction: "Mecham has failed to show that these members of his family, who presumably know his offense, will be unable to supervise his attendance." Slip. op. at 8. The Court of Appeals determined that because the incident occurred in a church, he needs supervision in any church. Slip op. at 9. This is not a narrowly tailored restriction.

This Court of Appeal's focus on the location of the offense—a church— does not provide sufficient basis to limit the free exercise of religion. This Court should grant review. RAP 13.4(b)(3).

2. **The community custody condition ordering Mr. Mecham to stay out of “restaurants marketed to and designed to cater to children” deprives him of fair warning, contrary to this Court’s requirements that community custody conditions must give an ordinary person notice and may not invite arbitrary enforcement. This Court should grant review. RAP 13.4(b)(1) and (3).**

The court’s restriction on restaurants requires Mr. Mecham to ascertain whether the restaurant “markets” or “caters” to children. These concepts are open to interpretation and do not provide fair notice of what restaurants this condition includes.

In *Irwin*, the defendant was ordered to not “frequent areas where minor children are known to congregate, as defined by the supervising community corrections officer (CCO).” *State v. Irwin*, 191 Wn. App. 644, 649, 364 P.3d 830 (2015). The condition did not include examples of prohibited locations. *Irwin* held that the condition failed the first prong of the vagueness analysis because, “[w]ithout some clarifying language or an illustrative list of prohibited locations ... the condition does not give ordinary people sufficient notice to ‘understand what conduct is proscribed.’” *Id.* at 655. The court acknowledged that it “may be true that, once the CCO sets locations where ‘children

are known to congregate' for Irwin, Irwin will have sufficient notice of what conduct is proscribed." *Id.* But this is not sufficient because it would still "leave the condition vulnerable to arbitrary enforcement," thereby failing the second prong of the vagueness analysis. *Id.*

Similar to *Irwin*, the condition prohibiting Mr. Mecham from going into restaurants "marketed to and designed to cater to children" fails to provide sufficient definiteness. CP 33 (Condition 16). Does this include "family friendly" restaurants? Does a small play area in one part of the restaurant mean that Mr. Mecham cannot enter the restaurant at all? Would this not include every fast food restaurant that offers kid friendly food or a play area anywhere in the restaurant? The Court of Appeals dismissed these questions, focusing on the condition's limitation on restaurants "designed" for children, which it found to be adequately definite. Slip op. at 10. The Court did not address the more abstract concepts of "marketing" and "catering to" that render this provision vague and subject to arbitrary enforcement. Nor is there a list of representative restaurants that would allow an ordinary person to interpret the meaning of

these concepts. *See e.g. State v. Wallmuller*, 194 Wn.2d 234, 245, 449 P.3d 619 (2019).

This Court should grant review under RAP 13.4(b)(1) and (3) of this restriction that fails to provide adequate notice of the prohibited conduct as required by due process. *State v. Padilla*, 190 Wn.2d 672, 679-80, 416 P.3d 712 (2018).

3. **This Court should grant review and reverse a community custody condition that restricts family relationships absent evidence this restriction is crime related, and which violates the right to intimate association. RAP 13.4(b)(2) and (3).**

The right of “intimate association” is a due process right.² U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Const. art. I, §3; *City of Bremerton v. Widell*, 146 Wn.2d 561, 575, 51 P.3d 733 (2002). “Intimate human relationships” are those “that attend the creation and sustenance of a family,” and includes the ability to cohabit with one’s relatives. *Widell*, 146 Wn.2d at 576. The choices to enter into and maintain certain intimate human relationships must be secured against undue intrusion by the State. *Widell*, 146 Wn.2d

² Under federal law, it is unclear whether the right to intimate association derives from the substantive due process right or a First Amendment right to freedom of association. *See e.g. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale*, 530 U.S. 640, 698, no. 26, 120 S. Ct. 2446, 147 L. Ed. 2d 554 (2000).

at 576. A condition that constitutes a limitation upon fundamental rights is only permissible if “imposed sensitively.” *State v. Riley*, 121 Wn.2d 22, 37, 846 P.2d 1365 (1993). Any restrictions on a fundamental right must be “reasonably necessary to accomplish the essential needs of the state and public order.” *Id.* at 37-38.

This right to intimate association is implicated when the State intercedes in Mr. Mecham’s relationships with his own family—here by requiring approval before Mr. Mecham forms relationships with families who have minor children. CP 33 (Condition 17). This condition is not “imposed sensitively” because it broadly covers all “families,” which would include his own. For instance, Mr. Mecham could form a relationship with his cousins or other relatives, and never have contact with a minor child in the family, yet still be in violation of this provision if he did not have this relationship approved by his service provider. RP 14. The Court of Appeals did not consider that this condition could limit Mr. Mecham’s own family relationships, and erroneously determined the right to intimate association was not implicated. Slip op. at 16.

Crime-related provisions must directly relate to the underlying circumstances of the criminal conduct. *State v. Johnson*, 4 Wn. App. 2d. 352, 358, 421 P.3d 969 (2018). The Court of Appeals' determination that this restriction was crime related impermissibly broadens the crime-related requirement articulated in *State v. Kinzle*, which similarly prohibited the defendant from dating women or forming relationships with families who have minor children. 181 Wn. App. 774, 785, 326 P.3d 870 (2014). There the defendant had a sustained relationship with the parents of the child victims. *Id.* In Mr. Mecham's case, the connection between the underlying crime of illegal sexual contact with minors and the defendant's relationship with an adult did not meet this basic threshold. The Court of Appeals cited only to the fact that Mr. Mecham sat at the victim's parent's table at a luncheon. Slip. op at 16. This incidental interaction is insufficient to warrant intrusion into Mr. Mecham's family life.

This condition limiting his right to intimate association is not reasonably necessary to achieving the State's goal of

protecting minors and is not crime related. This court should grant review and reverse this condition. RAP 13.4(b)(2)(3).

E. CONCLUSION

For the reasons provided, this Court should grant review and reverse the Court of Appeals. Convictions. RAP 13.4(b)(1)(2)(3).

Respectfully submitted this the 1st day of April 2020.

s/ Kate Benward
Washington State Bar Number 43651
Washington Appellate Project
1511 Third Ave, Ste 610
Seattle, WA 98101
Telephone: (206) 587-2711
Fax: (206) 587-2711
E-mail: katebenward@washapp.org

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON,)	No. 79008-1-I
)	
Respondent,)	
)	DIVISION ONE
v.)	
)	
JOEL IXAAC MECHAM,)	UNPUBLISHED OPINION
)	
Appellant.)	FILED: March 2, 2020
_____)	

MANN, A.C.J. — Joel Mecham appeals three of the community custody conditions imposed by the trial court. Mecham contends the conditions are not crime-related, are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, infringe his rights to intimate association, freedom of speech, and free exercise of his religion. We affirm in part, and reverse and remand in part to strike two conditions.

I.

Mecham entered a negotiated guilty plea to the offense of second degree child molestation and fourth degree assault with a sexual motivation. Mecham admitted to sexually touching minors in a church and at a bus stop. Mecham agreed to an exceptional sentence of 20 months and 304 days. At sentencing, Mecham contested only the community custody conditions requested by the State.

The incident involving the second degree child molestation conviction occurred on August 27, 2017. J.L. and her seven-year-old daughter, Y.L., went to a church service with their family. After the church service, the family stayed at church for a lunch event. While the lunch was being set up, J.L. and Y.L. went downstairs to a playroom. Another four-year-old child and a male, later identified as Mecham, were in the playroom. J.L. and Y.L. returned upstairs for lunch.

During lunch, J.L. sat at a table with her children, her mother, Mecham's parents and Mecham's older brother. After Y.L. finished eating, she asked her mother if she could return to the playroom, J.L. agreed, and Y.L. returned to the playroom alone. A few minutes later, Y.L. returned to J.L. at the lunch table and whispered that someone had picked her up from behind.

Later that evening, J.L. asked Y.L. who picked her up at church and Y.L. said she thought it was a son of the parents who were sitting with them at lunch. Y.L. described the man as wearing a red t-shirt; J.L. recalled that Mecham had been wearing a red t-shirt and they sat with his parents at lunch. Y.L. described the incident, explaining that Mecham had grabbed her from behind and reached down the front of her shorts, touching her private spot, "tapping it two times." Y.L. was very upset when describing the incident to her mother.

The incident involving the fourth degree assault with sexual motivation occurred on May 19, 2016. Mecham walked up to a 16-year-old girl, H.J., at a bus stop, reached over her shoulder and grabbed her breast underneath her shirt and bra. H.J. screamed and ran home and told her friend Candi. Candi and H.J. drove to the bus stop and located Mecham walking north. Candi and H.J. followed Mecham in Candi's car and

called 911. When Deputy Mark Stich arrived, Candi explained that Mecham had grabbed H.J.'s breast and pointed him out to Deputy Stich. Deputy Stich detained Mecham.

On October 26, 2017, Detective Saarinen interviewed Mecham about molesting Y.L. Mecham admitted to playing with Y.L. and another female child in the playroom. Mecham denied touching Y.L. anywhere other than her arms and shoulders. During the interview, Mecham admitted to the incident on May 19, 2016, that he tried to grab the breast of a stranger at a bus stop. Mecham said that the woman screamed and ran away, and that they were the only ones at the bus stop and it was "just too easy."

At sentencing, the trial court imposed several conditions that Mecham contests on appeal.

II.

We review community custody conditions for abuse of discretion and will reverse community custody conditions that are manifestly unreasonable. State v. Valencia, 169 Wn.2d 782, 791-92, 239 P.3d 1059 (2010). If imposition of the community custody condition violates the constitution it is manifestly unreasonable. Valencia, 169 Wn.2d at 791-92. We review the trial court's finding that the community custody prohibition is crime-related for substantial supporting evidence. State v. Zimmer, 146 Wn. App. 405, 413, 190 P.3d 121 (2008). We do not presume that a community custody condition is constitutional. Valencia, 169 Wn.2d at 793.

"Washington sentencing courts are required to impose certain community custody conditions in specified circumstances and may impose others." State v. Bahl, 164 Wn.2d 739, 744, 193 P.3d 678 (2008). The Sentencing Reform Act (SRA), ch.

9.94A RCW, sets forth the mandatory, waivable, and discretionary community conditions that courts impose during sentencing. The SRA permits the court to order an offender to: refrain from direct or indirect contact with the victim of the crime or a specified class of individuals, participate in crime-related treatment or counseling services, participate in rehabilitative programs or otherwise perform affirmative conduct reasonably related to the circumstances of the offense, the offender's risk of reoffending, or the safety of the community, and comply with any crime-related prohibitions. RCW 9.94A.703(3)(b), (c), (d), (f). Crime-related prohibitions are discretionary conditions that are directly related to the circumstances of the crime but need not be causally related to the crime. RCW 9.94A.030(10); Zimmer, 146 Wn. App. at 413.

A defendant's constitutional rights during community placement are subject to the infringements authorized by the SRA. Bahl, 164 Wn.2d at 765. "More careful review of sentencing conditions is required where those conditions interfere with a fundamental constitutional right." State v. Warren, 165 Wn.2d 17, 32, 195 P.3d 940 (2008). Conditions interfering with a fundamental constitutional right "must be reasonably necessary to accomplish the essential needs of the State and public order" and "must be sensitively imposed." Warren, 165 Wn.2d at 32.

Community custody conditions may be unconstitutionally vague or overbroad when they are not crime related. The Fourteenth Amendment and article I, section 3 of the Washington Constitution require that citizens have fair warning of proscribed conduct. U.S. Const. Amend. XIV; Wash. Const. art. I, §3. A statute is unconstitutionally vague if it does not define the criminal offense with sufficient

definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is proscribed, or does not provide ascertainable standards of guilt to protect against arbitrary enforcement.

Bahl, 164 Wn.2d at 752-53.

"Overbreadth analysis is intended to ensure that the legislative enactments do not prohibit constitutionally protected conduct, such as free speech." City of Seattle v. Ivan, 71 Wn. App. 145, 149, 856 P.2d 1116 (1993). When evaluating overbreadth challenges to community custody conditions, the court considers if the challenged statute reaches constitutionally protected speech or conduct, and whether it proscribes a substantial amount of that speech or conduct. State v. Knowles, 91 Wn. App. 367, 372, 957 P.2d 797 (1998).

Mecham raises several challenges to each of the following community custody conditions:

(5) Do not possess or consume controlled substances unless you have a legally issued prescription.

(16) Stay out of: parks used for youth activities, schools k-12 grades, daycare facilities, playgrounds, wading pools, swimming pools being used for youth activities, play areas (indoor or outdoor), sports fields being used for youth activities, arcades, church services, restaurants marketed to and designed to cater to children, and any specific location identified in advance by DOC or CCO. May attend church services and restaurants if accompanied and supervised by an adult aware of the offenses and approved by the CCO.

(17) Do not date women who have minor children, as directed by the supervising Community Corrections Officer. Disclose sex offender status prior to any sexual contact. Sexual contact in a relationship is prohibited until the treatment provider/Community Corrections Officer approves of such. Do not form relationships with families who have minor children except as approved by Sex. Dev. Provider.

We address each challenge in the order of these conditions.

A.

Mecham contends that condition 5 is both unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. We disagree.

Condition 5 states “Do not possess or consume controlled substances unless you have a legally issued prescription.” First, Mecham contends that condition 5 does not provide him with sufficient notice because the court did not check the box in the judgment and sentence prohibiting the defendant from possessing or consuming marijuana without a valid prescription. This argument fails because the prohibition is included in Appendix 4.2 and the judgment and sentence provides that “[t]he defendant shall comply with Additional Conditions of Community Custody as set forth in Appendix 4.2.”

Next, Mecham contends that the trial court’s failure to define a “controlled substance” is unconstitutionally vague because its use and possession in Washington is decriminalized and therefore, a person of ordinary intelligence would not be on notice that its use is prohibited.

This court recently addressed the issue of whether a community custody condition that prohibits the association with known users and sellers of “illegal drugs” was unconstitutionally vague because it was unclear whether “illegal drugs” included marijuana. In Pers. Restraint of Brettell, 6 Wn. App. 2d 161, 170-71, 430 P.3d 677 (2018). We held that the marijuana usage remains a federal offense under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) and therefore, although recreational marijuana use and possession has been decriminalized in Washington, it does not excuse a person

from knowing that marijuana is still “illegal” federally. 21 U.S.C. §§ 812, 844; RCW 69.50.360. Under the CSA, a controlled substance is defined as

a drug or other substance, or immediate precursor, included in schedule I, II, III, IV, or V of part B of this subchapter. The term does not include distilled spirits, wine, malt beverages, or tobacco, as those terms are defined or used in subtitle E of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.

21 U.S.C § 802(7). Marijuana is a controlled substance under the CSA and Mecham must obey all laws, including federal law. 21 U.S.C. § 821. Therefore, the restriction that Mecham not possess or use controlled substances without a prescription is not unconstitutionally vague and clearly includes marijuana.

Mecham also contends that this condition is overbroad because marijuana use is not prohibited by law in Washington. Since marijuana is a controlled substance under the CSA, its use is prohibited by federal law and therefore the condition is not unconstitutionally overbroad.

B.

Mecham contends that condition 16 infringes his right to freely exercise religion. We disagree.

Condition 16 prohibits Mecham from attending church services unless he is accompanied and supervised by an adult aware of his offenses and approved by the CCO. Mecham contends that the condition is subject to strict scrutiny and the State has not used the least restrictive means for protecting children at church services.

Religious free exercise is protected under the First Amendment and the Free Exercise Clause of the Washington Constitution. U.S. Const. Amend. I; Wash. Const. art. I, §11. “Religious free exercise embraces two concepts: the freedom to believe and

the freedom to act.” State v. Balzer, 91 Wn. App. 44, 52, 954 P.2d 931 (1998) (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303, 60 S. Ct. 900, 903, 84 L. Ed. 1213 (1940)).

“The first is absolute while the second, by the nature of our democracy cannot be.”

Balzer, 91 Wn. App. at 52. Community custody conditions that burden the free exercise of religion must satisfy strict scrutiny. Balzer, 91 Wn. App. at 53.

Strict scrutiny requires the defendant to prove that the government restriction has a coercive effect on the practice of religion. Balzer, 91 Wn. App. at 53. First, the defendant must demonstrate that his religious convictions are sincerely held and central to the practice of his religion. Balzer, 91 Wn. App. at 54. The State concedes that Mecham’s family was very involved in church. Next, the defendant must demonstrate that the restriction unduly burdens free exercise, which is shown if its “coercive effect . . . operates against a party in the practice of his [or her] religion.” Balzer, 91 Wn. App. at 54.

Mecham has not shown that he will be unduly burdened by this restriction. Mecham’s crime involved abusing an unsupervised child at church. The day of the offense, Mecham was attending church with his mother, father, and older brother. Mecham has failed to show that these members of his family, who presumably know his offense, will be unable to supervise his attendance at church. Thus, from the record, Mecham will be able to continue attending church services in the same manner as before his conviction.

Further, even if the restriction unduly burdened Mecham’s free exercise, the restriction satisfies strict scrutiny. Once the defendant “establishes a burden upon religious free exercise, the court determines if the burden is offset by a compelling state

interest served by the least restrictive means to achieve that interest.” Balzer, 91 Wn. App. at 56. “‘Compelling interests’ are those government objectives based upon the necessities of national or community life such as threats to public health, peace, and welfare.” Balzer, 91 Wn. App. at 56. “If the government demonstrates that it has a compelling interest in enforcing the enactment for the peace and safety of the state, that interest will justify infringement upon [the defendant’s] religious free exercise.” Balzer, 91 Wn. App. at 56.

The State has a compelling interest to protect families who attend church services from Mecham. Mecham committed the offense in a church. He abused a seven-year-old in the church playroom while the congregation enjoyed lunch upstairs. Mecham was not deterred from abusing Y.L. even though he had seen J.L. accompany Y.L. to the playroom. Merely prohibiting Mecham’s contact with children is insufficient to accomplish the State’s interest because Mecham needs supervision to prevent this type of contact.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by prohibiting Mecham from attending church services without the supervision of an adult aware of his offense because the restriction is not unduly burdensome, serves a compelling state interest, and is narrowly tailored.

C.

Next, Mecham contends that condition 16’s prohibition on visiting “restaurants marketed to and designed to cater to children” is unconstitutionally vague. We disagree.

Mecham contends that this case is like Irwin because there, the court held that “areas where minor children are known to congregate” was vague because it did not provide sufficient definiteness. State v. Irwin, 191 Wn. App. 644, 649, 364 P.3d 830 (2015). In Irwin, the court concluded that the condition “do not frequent areas where minor children are known to congregate, as defined by the supervising CCO” was vague because it did not provide sufficient notice to understand the conduct proscribed. Irwin, 191 Wn. App. at 654. The court noted that “it may be true that, once the CCO sets locations where ‘children are known to congregate’ for Irwin, Irwin will have sufficient notice of what conduct is proscribed,” but that would leave the condition vulnerable to arbitrary enforcement. Irwin, 191 Wn. App. at 655.

Here, the trial court sought to provide Mecham with sufficient definiteness that lacked in Irwin. The list of prohibited places is extensive. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court changed the prohibition from restaurants to “restaurants marketed to and designed to cater to children.” The vagueness doctrine does not require impossible precision for community custody conditions. State v. Wallmuller, 194 Wn.2d 234, 244-45, 449 P.3d 619 (2019).

Mecham expresses concerns that it is unclear whether “family friendly” restaurants, restaurants with a small play area, or that have a children’s menu are included. Designed means “done, performed, or made with purpose and intent often despite an appearance of being accidental, spontaneous or natural.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 612 (2002). Design means “deliberate purposive planning.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 611 (2002). In context, the term designed limits the scope of restaurants to those that have been made specifically

for children, and not merely a family friendly restaurant. The restaurants that Mecham must avoid are those with play areas, games, or entertainment for children.

D.

Mecham challenges condition 17 based on his right to intimate association under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Washington Constitution. U.S. Const. § XIV; Const. art. I § 3; City of Bremerton v. Widell, 146 Wn.2d 561, 575, 51 P.3d 733 (2002). Intimate human relationships are those “that attend the creation and sustenance of a family” and include, marriage, childbirth, the raising and educating of one’s children, and cohabitation with one’s relatives. Widell, 146 Wn.2d at 576. The United States Supreme Court “has endorsed a continuum approach, delineating where the ‘objective characteristics locate [the relationship] on a spectrum from the most intimate to the most attenuated of personal attachments.’” Widell, 146 Wn.2d at 576-77 (citing Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 620, 104 S. Ct. 3244, 82 L. Ed. 2d 462 (1984)).

Determining the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply to government action alleged to infringe the right of marriage requires a two-step analysis: first, a court must ask whether the policy or action is a direct or substantial interference with the right of marriage; second, if the policy or action is a direct and substantial interference with the right of marriage, apply strict scrutiny, otherwise apply rational basis scrutiny. In this context, strict scrutiny means that the state action burdening marriage cannot be upheld “unless it is supported by sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those interests.”

Widell, 146 Wn.2d at 579.

1.

Mecham contends that condition 17’s prohibition, “do not date women who have minor children, as directed by the supervising Community Corrections Officer” is not

crime-related, is unconstitutionally vague, and infringes his right to intimate relationships. We disagree.

Crime-related restrictions must be directly related to the crime. Here, the crime involved minor children. Prohibiting Mecham from dating women who have minor children protects a class of victims. The SRA allows the court to order an offender to “refrain from direct or indirect contact with the victim of the crime or a specified class of individuals.” RCW 9.94.703(3)(b). We apply rational basis scrutiny because Mecham has not explained how this condition is “a direct or substantial interference with the right of marriage.” The State’s goal here is protecting women and their minor children and the condition satisfies that goal.

Mecham contends that “as directed by the supervising Community Custody Officer” renders the condition unconstitutionally vague. The condition does not fail for vagueness under Bahl. In Bahl, the court concluded that the restriction on accessing pornographic materials was unconstitutionally vague because pornography is a subjective term and that allowing the CCO to direct what falls within the condition made the vagueness problem more apparent. 164 Wn.2d at 758. In Bahl, allowing enforcement by the CCO of a subjective term could lead to arbitrary enforcement. 164 Wn.2d at 758. We do not hold the same concern here. The prohibition is clear and not subjective. Mecham is prohibited from dating women with minor children without CCO approval.

2.

Mecham contends that condition 17's requirement to "disclose sex offender status prior to any sexual contact" is an unconstitutional compulsion of speech and is not crime-related. We agree.

The right to freedom of speech necessarily includes the freedom to refrain from speech. U.S. Const. Amend. I, XIV; Const. art. I § 5; Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714, 97 S. Ct. 1428, 51 L. Ed. 2d 752 (1977). "The protection from compelled speech extends to statements of fact as well as of opinion." State v. K.H.-H., 185 Wn.2d 745, 749, 374 P.3d 1141 (2016). "The compelled speech doctrine generally dictates that the State cannot force individuals to deliver messages that they do not wish to make." K.H.-H., 185 Wn.2d at 749. Under Bahl, a community custody condition that limits a fundamental right is permissible, provided it is imposed sensitively. 164 Wn.2d at 757. First Amendment rights may be restricted if reasonably necessary to accomplish the essential needs of the state and public order. Bahl, 164 Wn.2d at 757.

The State contends that K.H.-H. is applicable because the court upheld a court-ordered apology letter as a permissible compulsion of speech. K.H.-H. was a 17-year-old male, adjudicated guilty of fourth degree sexual assault with sexual motivation of C.R., a female acquaintance from his high school. The trial court ordered K.H.-H. to "address to C.R. 'a sincere written letter of apology . . . mean[ing] an admission that he did what he was accused of what he's [sic] doing and [is] sorry he put her in that position.'" K.H.-H., 185 Wn.2d at 747. On appeal, K.H.-H. contended that the condition was an unconstitutional compulsion of speech. K.H.-H., 185 Wn.2d at 748. The court concluded that, while the letter was a compulsion of speech, it was reasonably

necessary to accomplish the goals of juvenile rehabilitation in the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977 (JJA), chapter 13.40 RCW. K.H.-H., 185 Wn.2d at 747.

The purpose of the SRA is to

[M]ake the criminal justice system accountable to the public by developing a system for the sentencing of felony offenders which structures, but does not eliminate, discretionary decisions affecting sentences, and to:

- (1) Ensure that the punishment for a criminal offense is proportionate to the seriousness of the offense and the offender's criminal history;
- (2) Promote respect for the law by providing punishment which is just;
- (3) Be commensurate with the punishment imposed on others committing similar offenses;
- (4) Protect the public;
- (5) Offer the offender an opportunity to improve himself or herself;
- (6) Make frugal use of the state's and local governments' resources; and
- (7) Reduce the risk of reoffending by offenders in the community.

RCW 9.94A.010.

Unlike the JJA, the goals of the SRA do not include rehabilitation. The State responds that

[r]equiring Mecham to disclose his sex offender status prior to any sexual contact is narrowly tailored and reasonably necessary to protect the public. Mecham's crimes against children demonstrated his utter inability to control his sexual urges. He explained that he assaulted H.J. at the bus[] stop because they were alone there at the time and it was "just too easy."[] Because Mecham declined to participate in his [presentence investigation interview], the report noted there was no information for the sentencing judge pertaining to the nature, severity and degree of Mecham's sexual deviancy.

The State asserts that its goal is to protect the public. The condition, however, is not sensitively imposed because there is nothing in the record supporting a risk to

consenting adults. The condition is not crime-related because Mecham's crimes were against minors and is an unconstitutional compulsion of speech.

3.

Mecham contends that condition 17's restriction on "sexual contact in a relationship . . . until the treatment provider/Community Corrections Officer approves of such" is an unconstitutional infringement on his right to intimate association and is not crime-related. We agree that it is not crime-related.

Crime-related restrictions must be directly related to the crime. Prohibiting sexual contact in a relationship until approved by the treatment provider or CCO is not crime-related because Mecham's victims were not in a relationship with him. Mecham declined to be interviewed for the presentence investigation report and the report stated that "[t]here is no available information pertaining to the possible nature, degree and severity of sexual deviancy experienced by Joel Mecham. A sexual deviancy evaluation may offer insight into any offense patterns and triggers, as well as an analysis of the possibility or likelihood of future re-offense." From this record, we cannot conclude that a prohibition on "sexual contact in a relationship" is crime-related.


4.

Mecham contends that condition 17's prohibition "do not form relationships with families who have minor children except as approved by Sex. Dev. Provider" is an unconstitutional infringement on his right to intimate association and is not crime-related. We disagree.


The right to form relationships with other families is not protected as a right to intimate association. Widell, 146 Wn.2d at 575. Under Widell, the court recognized that

“an engaged couple who is not cohabitating is not entitled to constitutional protection.” 146 Wn.2d at 577. Here, the State must satisfy rational basis scrutiny to restrict Mecham from forming relationships with families who have minor children. This restriction protects minors and is crime-related because, in both incidents, Mecham’s victim was a minor. Mecham’s family and Y.L.’s family sat together at the church luncheon. Prohibiting Mecham from forming new relationships with families who have minor children is directly related to the nature of Mecham’s crime because Mecham took advantage of these established relationships when he abused Y.L.

We affirm in part, and reverse and remand in part to the trial court to strike the prohibitions against “sexual contact in a relationship is prohibited until the treatment provider/Community Corrections Officer approves of such” and “disclose sex offender status prior to any sexual contact.”



WE CONCUR:





DECLARATION OF FILING AND MAILING OR DELIVERY

The undersigned certifies under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Washington that on the below date, the original document **Petition for Review to the Supreme Court** to which this declaration is affixed/attached, was filed in the **Court of Appeals** under **Case No. 79008-1-I**, and a true copy was mailed with first-class postage prepaid or otherwise caused to be delivered to the following attorney(s) or party/parties of record at their regular office or residence address as listed on ACORDS:

respondent Seth Fine
[sfine@snoco.org]
[Diane.Kremenich@co.snohomish.wa.us]
Snohomish County Prosecuting Attorney

petitioner

Attorney for other party



MARIA ANA ARRANZA RILEY, Legal Assistant
Washington Appellate Project

Date: April 1, 2020

WASHINGTON APPELLATE PROJECT

April 01, 2020 - 3:49 PM

Transmittal Information

Filed with Court: Court of Appeals Division I
Appellate Court Case Number: 79008-1
Appellate Court Case Title: Joel I. Mecham, Appellant v. State of Washington, Respondent
Superior Court Case Number: 17-1-02850-3

The following documents have been uploaded:

- 790081_Petition_for_Review_20200401154818D1296836_3683.pdf
This File Contains:
Petition for Review
The Original File Name was washapp.040120-13.pdf

A copy of the uploaded files will be sent to:

- Diane.Kremenich@co.snohomish.wa.us
- diane.kremenich@snoco.org
- sfine@snoco.org
- shalloran@co.snohomish.wa.us

Comments:

Sender Name: MARIA RILEY - Email: maria@washapp.org

Filing on Behalf of: Kate Benward - Email: katebenward@washapp.org (Alternate Email: wapofficemail@washapp.org)

Address:
1511 3RD AVE STE 610
SEATTLE, WA, 98101
Phone: (206) 587-2711

Note: The Filing Id is 20200401154818D1296836